I hold a MSc in Economics from ENS Paris-Saclay where I specialized in Microeconomics and Public Economics. Currently, I am interning at the University of California Santa Barbara as a research assistant with Pr. Youssef Benzarti, working on taxation.
I plan to start a PhD program in Public Finance in Fall 2019.
References available upon request.
Tax evasion: how government cooperation could be a game changer
This paper models how a coalition of countries could force a tax haven to cooperate. The coalition is built around a common capital tax rate and a joint tariff on the imports from the tax haven. The tariff is the threat used to induce the tax haven to cooperate. Thanks to a game theoretical approach, we describe how the members of the coalition bargain to set the common capital tax. Then the optimal tariff and its incidence are derived. We show that a mutually beneficial common capital tax can be set in the coalition. Then, we demonstrate that a tariff on tax haven imports is efficient to force the tax haven to cooperate if the import level from the tax haven is sufficiently high and if the imported goods are normal.
Government bond yield, fiscal policy and tax compliance.
This paper investigates the determinants of the government bond yield spreads. It focuses on the elements related to fiscal policy. It also takes into account the tax compliance through an interaction term between the primary balance accounting for the fiscal policy and the elasticity of tax compliance to tax rate. As expected, we find that the effect of fiscal consolidation is weakenned when the country has a low tax compliance. This effect is robust to a change in fiscal policy proxy. The specification of the model enables us to distangle the effect of the fiscal consolidation and that of the tax compliance. Finally we compute partial elasticity of government bond yield spread to fiscal consolidation.
Theoretical effects of ambiguity on tax evasion: is unclarity beneficial to tax compliance?
This paper reviews the behavior of tax evader when they face ambiguity about the probability of audit. Therefore it uses the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff Marinacci & Mukerji(2005). Then it introduces inequity in this framework. Concerning ambiguity averse agents, this work reveals that ambiguity about the probability of audit appears to be efficient to reduce the evaded amount of income. Then inequity by decreasing the global wealth of agent, tends to decrease the evaded amount of taxes.Taking the behavior of agents into account, we deduce what the optimal fiscal policy is. As most of people are risk and ambiguity averse, the State should implement ambiguity around the probability of audit. Then a numerical example is derived so as to obtain more accurate and realistic conclusions.
La Concurrence Fiscale en Europe
Ce mémoire tente de répondre aux questions suivantes: Comment en sommes nous arrivés à une concurrence fiscale en Europe ? Quelle est la source de cette concurrence ? Quelles sont les risques et conséquence d’une course au moins-disant fiscal ?